Ground Safety Issues by Kirkpatrick, Paul D.
Introduction 
In the history of humankind, every space adventure, great or small, has begun on 
the ground. While this seems to be stating the obvious, mission and flight 
hardware designers who have overlooked this fact have paid a high price, either 
in loss or damage to the hardware pre-launch, or in mission failure or reduction. 
Designers may risk not only their flight hardware, but they may also risk their 
lives, their co-workers lives and even the general public by not heeding safety on 
the ground. Their eyes may be on the stars but their feet are on the ground! 
This discussion applies to all forms of flight hardware from the largest rockets to 
the smallest spare parts. 
Typical Ground Safety Issues 
A very common issue that the Ground Safety Community encounters is lack of 
recognition of the need for ground safety documentation and reviews. This is 
most often expressed as 'What do you mean I have to get ground safety 
approval?" Many designers feel that if the hardware is safe to fly, it should also 
be safe on the ground, or that the safety processes used during development 
and manufacturing are sufficient for use at the launch and landing sites. Of 
course this is not true. At most of the world's launch sites, processes exist to 
assure that the hardware, it's Ground Support Equipment and operations are in 
compliance with requirements applicable to that site, It is not that the sites do not 
trust the hardware; it is more the case that, up until the delivery, the hardware 
has the privilege to be a stand-a-lone process. Upon arrival, the hardware enters 
into an integrated environment often consisting of the general public, other flight 
hardware, and facilities. The safety approval processes are structured to provide 
assurances to all interested parties that the risk is acceptable or has been 
controlled. 
There is also a tendency for hardware owners to pay less attention to the ground 
support equipment than to flight hardware. This is understandable as the flight 
hardware is what the mission is all about. However, this can lead to situations 
where the ground support equipment is not adequate for the job or, at best, has 
been inadequately analyzed for the role it is to perform. The misuse of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment is also a major concern. This occurs 
when a program purchases COTS and then modifies it to meet their needs. Of 
course, this then shifts the equipment out of the category of COTS and into a 
self-built category of equipment requiring a full analysis. When such cases are 
discovered, there is a mad scramble to get the equipment reviewed and 
approved. This has the potential to delay processing and a possible impact to 
launch. 
An important requirement many projects tend to overlook is the use of written 
procedures. Written procedures are critical in assuring that operations are run in
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20130012514 2019-08-31T00:48:13+00:00Z
the manner that the test team has intended. The lack of adequate procedures or, 
worse yet, the failure to use written procedures has been listed as the cause of 
numerous accidents. The timing of the production of procedures is also 
important. A procedure that is hurried through development and review and is 
issued just prior to the operation can be just as risky as no procedure at all. An 
example of this is the Apollo I fire, when the procedure for the "plugs out" test 
had hundreds of changes made to it and was issued the night before. This 
essentially meant the test team was seeing the procedure for the first time during 
the test. The use and control of written procedures can not be over-emphasized. 
Hardware providers must make special considerations while their hardware is in 
the ground environment. These considerations cover such areas as: 
Contingency Planning - Unexpected events, whether external to the 
hardware, such as heavy weather, or internal, such as a propellant leak, 
must be planned for so when they occur prompt corrective action is taken. 
Tools - the proper design and use of tools is important to complete pre-
launch processing. The accounting for hand tools is critical so they do not 
become part of the flight hardware. 
Chemicals and Biologics - It is commonly accepted that these 
commodities when contained in experiments present hazards to the flight 
crews; however, their handling on the ground present different problems 
which are often overlooked by developers. This generally applies to 
sample preparation or return. Because during these times, the 
commodities are outside their containment. These same issues also 
apply to the return of trash. 
Mechanical Systems (Pressure/Ordnance/Deployable) - All of these 
systems contain stored energy which must be released in a controlled 
manner at the proper time. This is often accomplished through the use of 
inhibits. The status of inhibits on the ground must be carefully tracked in 
order to not inadvertently activate the system. 
In summary, when ground processing flight hardware, the same level of vigilance 
is necessary as is applied to flight operations. 
The Commonality or Uncommonality of Ground Standards 
Depending on the location of the ground processing, a hardware provider faces a 
myriad of processes from none to complex. This is a reflection of the fact that 
processing sites are owned and operated by nation states, who expect their laws 
will apply. In spite of the fact that the processing of flight hardware and its 
ground support equipment has developed in a somewhat standard process, the 
requirements among the various sites have continued to be independently 
developed and applied.
One exception to this is the human-rated International Space Station Program. 
Three of the processing sites, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in the USA, the 
Guiana Space Center (CSG) in Kourou, French Guiana, and Tanegashima 
Space Center (TNSC) in Japan, use the same document as the basis of their 
requirements with each site adding their own local requirements. This document 
was originally written for the US Space Shuttle and was based on U.S. Air Force 
Range requirements. So there exists now a string of related requirements which 
can serve as precedence. 
For the expendable launch vehicles, the applicable requirements remain site 
specific. The cause of this is related to the large amount energy in these 
vehicles and the potential for harm to the general public. It is this public safety 
facet that makes the processing sites reluctant to adopt outside standards. As a 
reminder for those programs that operate on both human-rated and non-human-
rated vehicles, when on the ground, neither the flight hardware nor the ground 
support equipment cares what it is flying on; meaning that the requirements for 
ground processing safety are generally the same regardless of vehicle. 
Across the various processing sites, there is a fair amount of commonality in the 
design requirements however; the rules governing operations across the sites 
tend to be unique, reflecting their national character. This makes the issuance of 
a common standard difficult. Adding to this difficulty is the reluctance of 
processing sites to accept hardware without completion of their review process. 
One area that may serve as a seed for commonality is the use of COTS. These 
items are used around the world in non-space applications without further review. 
An agreement by the launch sites to determine a list of acceptable 
testing/approval agencies for COTS and then accept them for use without further 
review would be helpful. 
This brings us to the topic of an ISO Standard. There currently exists a three 
part ISO Standard for space systems (ISO 14620 - Space systems -- Safety 
'requirements -- Part 1: System safety; Part 2: Launch site operations; and Part 3: 
Flight safety systems). To my limited knowledge the issue with these standards 
is that their development does not appear to include the very programs that 
would make use of them. I believe this is based in part to the strong aspect of 
national ownership of the sites as previously discussed. The ISO Standards, 
along with the discussion of COTS above, could serve as a basis for a common 
standard both internationally and intranationally. 
The Cost of Lack of Commonality 
The cost of this lack of a common ground safety standard is primarily borne by 
the payload and cargo community. The launch vehicle community tends to be 
fixed based and is not easily moved from site to site. The costs incurred in 
complying with individual sites safety requirements can be minimized by ensuring
the site is included early in the mission process. However, designing payloads 
and cargos to support individual sites can prevent the development of common 
spacecraft buses and associated ground safety equipment that are universally 
acceptable. It is this hindrance of cost savings through commonality that is the 
true cost. 
Conclusion 
In order to increase the efficiency of ground processing and thereby drive down 
costs, a universal standard covering ground safety requirements and processes 
is required. There are processes at work now such as the ISO Standard and the 
International Space station processes that can serve as the basis for such a 
common standard, If we can develop a standard for ground safety, can one for 
flight be far behind?
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